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REFORMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
ONE STATE AT A TIME
Thomas W. Hiltachk* †
Introduction
The genius of our United States Constitution is the delicate balance our
Founding Fathers struck between empowering a national government and
preserving the inherent sovereignty of individual states. Any proposed governmental reform that would interfere with that balance should be looked
upon skeptically. Recent proposals to do away with the Electoral College in
favor of a national popular vote for President deserve such careful examination. But that does not mean that reform is out of reach. We have only to
look to the Constitution itself to find that the answer lies in the self-interest
of each state.
I am an attorney specializing in election law in California. I recently authored a proposed statewide initiative that would change California’s
winner-take-all system of awarding its fifty-five electoral votes to a system
currently employed by the states of Maine and Nebraska. In each of these
two states, the presidential candidate winning the popular vote in each of the
state’s congressional districts is awarded one electoral vote while the winner
of the state’s overall popular vote is awarded two electoral votes. Pundits
and partisans immediately questioned my motivation in offering such a proposal, suggesting that I was trying to rig the election—you see, I am a
Republican living in a predominantly Democratic state. The truth, however,
is that I am a Californian first and foremost.
I. The Need for Reform in California
One would think that with fifty-five electoral votes (nearly twenty percent
of the total needed to win election) presidential candidates would be falling all
over themselves trying to woo California voters. That is not the case. In fact,
no presidential candidate has seriously campaigned in California in decades.
Interestingly, California has historically been either a reliably “red” or “blue”
state for extended periods of time. (It chose the Republican nominee from
1968–1988 and the Democratic nominee from 1992–2004, though concededly
the Republican nominees were favorite sons Nixon and Reagan and nearfavorite son Ford.) Yet our state is also extremely diverse—ethnically,
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geographically, and politically. We have had a Democratic-controlled legislature for decades, and yet three of our last four governors have been
Republicans. Populations on our coastline are generally liberal, while the
state’s great central valley and desert regions are mostly conservative. Yet
both political parties recently have been losing ground in voter registration
to those choosing to “decline to state” any party affiliation.
Moreover, California is simply too large in population and geography to
compare to any other state. With fifty-five electoral votes, California has
twenty-one more than its nearest rival, Texas. Indeed, this twenty-one electoral vote difference is equivalent to the electoral vote total of other “big”
states such as Illinois and Pennsylvania. California’s individual congressional districts have about 640,000 residents, more than reside in each of
three different states and the District of Columbia (each with three electoral
votes). Meanwhile, California has six congressional districts covering a
geographic area in excess of 10,000 square miles, bigger than nine states
and the District of Columbia.
In the last presidential election, President Bush received over 5.5 million
votes in California, but no electoral votes, since his opponent John Kerry
received a majority of the statewide votes that year. Similarly, Democrat
nominee Bill Clinton received all of California’s electoral votes in 1992
even though he won only a plurality of the popular vote in California (and in
the nation). It is no wonder that voter turnout in California has declined
steadily in successive presidential elections.
There are consequences to candidates taking California for granted, no
matter who wins the White House. For example, according to the nonpartisan California Institute for Federal Policy Research, for over two decades
Californians annually have sent billions more in federal taxes to Washington
than they received back in federal grants, payments, and other program services. In 2003, California’s federal tax payment deficit was a staggering $50
billion, nearly $1,400 for every man, woman, and child in California. In
sum, California receives a return of only about seventy-nine cents on every
dollar it sends to Washington.
I have watched with amusement as our legislature has continuously
moved the date of our presidential primary in an attempt to chase the candidates—first from June in a presidential election year to late March, then to
early March, and now to early February—all to no avail. In fact, both political parties in California have now changed the manner in which they award
convention delegates in the primary from a winner-take-all system to an
allocation based on congressional districts. Indeed, the Democratic Party has
had this district-based system since the 1970s.
There is no doubt that our winner-take-all system does not inure to the
benefit of all Californians. Large segments of our society and large parts of
our state are simply irrelevant to the presidential campaigns—that is, the
votes of these citizens do not count. If one accepts this premise, then the
question becomes what California can do to better reflect its voters and to
become relevant in presidential politics.
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II. Winner-Take-All
I have no particular quarrel with a system of awarding all of a state’s
electoral votes to the winner of the state’s popular vote if that method best
serves the interests of that state. Indeed, I firmly believe that each state
should be free to choose any reasonable manner of awarding its electoral
votes. Our national democracy is benefited by empowering its fifty state
“laboratories of democracy.” Winner-take-all is a valid method that serves
the interests of many states, particularly smaller states or those where the
voting population is more homogeneous. But such a system is no longer
appropriate for California.
III. Reform Proposals
Over the last few years, two reform proposals have been discussed in
California. In 2006, our Democratic-controlled legislature passed a bill that
would make California a signatory to an Electoral College compact (AB
2948). The compact, entered into by each state, would require each state to
award its electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote. Under
the California legislation, the requirement that California award its electoral
votes to the winner of the national popular vote would not become effective
until states possessing at least 270 electoral votes (the majority needed to
win election) have also adopted the compact. Currently, only the states of
Maryland and New Jersey have entered into the compact. Governor Schwarzenegger, a Republican, vetoed the California bill.
The other reform proposal is the one that I authored as an initiative last
summer. The idea of awarding electoral votes by congressional district in
California is not new. Legislation had been introduced more than once in the
past, but it received little attention. Since the past bills were always proposed by a Republican, they quickly died in the legislature. My proposal, in
contrast, takes the issue directly to the voters via the state’s initiative process.
A. The Electoral Compact
The electoral compact is nothing more than an end run around amending
the United States Constitution. Supporters of the compact simply prefer a
national popular vote for President. Their problems are that our Constitution
provides otherwise and that there is a perception (probably valid) that a constitutional amendment would not gain the necessary assent of three-fourths
of the states. Indeed, it is ironic that the electoral compact proposal relies on
an assertion of state’s rights to enter into a compact with other states to
achieve the goal of relinquishing each state’s independent role in the selection of the President and Vice President as provided by our Founding
Fathers.
Even supporters of a national popular vote have reason to oppose the
electoral compact proposal. Setting aside the serious constitutional issues
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presented by the current compact proposal, the compact would establish a
dangerous precedent by allowing a small number of states to dictate the
electoral outcome. If the compact is legal, why would states be limited to
awarding electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote? Could
they also agree to award their electoral votes to the loser of the national
popular vote? Or to the winner of the popular vote in just the compacting
states? Or why not to a specific candidate preferred by the compacting states
without regard to election results? For example, the eleven largest states by
population could agree to award their 271 electoral votes to any candidate,
thereby eliminating the overwhelming preference of voters in the other
thirty-nine states. This is not reform.
The basic argument against a national popular vote also explains why a
constitutional amendment proposing a national popular vote is likely to fail.
The Electoral College was designed to protect the interests of the smaller
states when electing a president. Indeed, it was one of the least-debated and
least-controversial provisions of the Constitution. Federalist No. 68 starts by
noting that “[t]he mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the
United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence,
which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.”
As Federalist No. 68 emphasizes, the Electoral College was designed
specifically to ensure that a candidate for President would appeal to and
have the confidence of the “whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of
it” that it would make for a successful presidency. A national popular vote
can not guarantee that result. The Electoral College, “be [it] not perfect, it is
at least excellent.”
B. The Maine-Nebraska Model
For California, allocating electoral votes in the same manner as Maine
and Nebraska would cause elections to better reflect voters’ preferences in
our large and diverse state. Some have argued that our congressional districts are mostly noncompetitive (the result of gerrymandering) and that, as
a consequence, the desired effect of making candidates compete for California’s votes would not occur. Clearly, some regions of our state could be
reliably counted in one column or the other, but large, undecided parts—
including California’s breadbasket (the Central Valley), San Diego, and the
Inland Empire—would yield a prevailing candidate several electoral votes.
Moreover, changing the Electoral College system might also prevent a future gerrymander in the next decade and increase the competitiveness of
districts.
Opponents of this reform proposal also argue that it would not be fair
unless the other large states (Texas, New York, Florida, etc.) adopted the
methodology. Fair to whom? Our Constitution specifically empowers states
to make their own choices in this regard. States should act in their own selfinterest. Is it fair to Californians that they are all but ignored in the selection
of our nation’s leader?
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Lastly, opponents have suggested that changing California’s system of
awarding its fifty-five electoral votes will sway the election to the Republican Party nominee; they essentially argue that a Democratic Party nominee
(no matter who it is) will not be able to win the presidency without a fiftyfive electoral vote lock. There is no history to support this theory; in fact, if
California would have awarded its electoral votes under this proposal in any
of the presidential elections over the last 100 years, not one election result
would have changed. What would have changed is that many Californians
would have had a meaningful role in the presidential election and, presumably, the issues important to Californians would also have been important to
the candidates seeking that office.
Conclusion
If our country desires to do away with the Electoral College, it should do
so in the manner contemplated by our Constitution: the deliberate amendment process. The so-called electoral compact should be rejected as an end
run around the Constitution. That does not mean, however, that each state
should not consider and re-consider the manner in which it allocates its electoral votes in a way that best reflects the election preferences of its citizens.
By doing so, reform is found within the basic structure of our Constitution
as the framers intended.

